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Internet Freedom Foundation
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The Delhi High Court has issued notice on LiveLaw’s petition against the restriction in India of three reels reporting Supreme Court hearings, two of which were blocked within fifteen minutes of upload without any order or reasons

On 19 November 2026, the Delhi High Court issued notice to the Union of India and to Meta on a writ petition filed by Live Law Media Private Limited, the company which publishes the legal news portal LiveLaw, and by its Director, Sindhu T.P. The petition is a constitutional challenge to the automated filter which Meta operates on Instagram and Facebook in India, and to the two regulatory demands of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) from which, on LiveLaw’s case, that filter derives. The first of these is Rule 4(4) of the IT Rules, 2021, which has since 20 February 2026 required large platforms to deploy automated tools against any content “exactly identical” to content already taken down under Rule 3(1)(d), the provision dealing with court orders and government takedown intimations, while the second consists of two unpublished advisories which the Ministry issued on 8 and 10 October 2026.

The petition arises from the restriction in India, between 27 and 30 October 2026, of three LiveLaw reels reporting proceedings before the Supreme Court, two of which were made inaccessible within fifteen minutes of being uploaded. No order, notice or statement of reasons was furnished to LiveLaw, and those who attempted to view the reels were informed only that Meta had acted upon a “legal request”, which has not been produced to this day. Two of the reels have not been restored, and a further reel was restricted on the night before the hearing. The restriction of content under local law has, on Meta’s own account, reached a very large scale in India, for its transparency report records that it restricted more than 5.4 million items in India in the first half of 2026, as against a little over 41,000 in the preceding six months.

The Court has granted the respondents four weeks to file their counter-affidavits and has listed the matter on 18 January 2027. The petition was drafted and filed by Advocates Yashpriya Sahran, Sahil Mander and Pragya Jain and was argued by Advocate Apar Gupta, and IFF is supporting LiveLaw in this challenge.

Background

The restriction of three reports of Supreme Court proceedings

LiveLaw has reported the proceedings of the Supreme Court, the High Courts and the tribunals since 2013, and a considerable part of that reporting is now published in the form of short video explainers on its verified Instagram account, @livelaw.in, which has more than ten lakh followers. In the last week of October 2026, three of these explainers were made unavailable to users in India, in the circumstances set out in the table below.

A person in India who attempted to open any of these reels was shown the statement, “The post is unavailable in India. We restricted access to this content pursuant to legal requirements under India’s Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules.” Under a tab marked “See Why”, Meta stated further, “We received a legal request to restrict this content. We reviewed it against our policies and conducted a legal and human rights assessment,” and then, “After the review, we restricted access to the content in the location where it goes against local law.”

LiveLaw, for its part, received no email, notification or order from Meta or from any authority, whether at the time the reels were restricted or when the first of them was restored. The first two explainers continue to be available on LiveLaw’s YouTube channel, where they had been viewed about 57,000 and 19,000 times respectively when the petition was prepared, a circumstance which cannot easily be reconciled with the existence of any order of general application against their content.

A further notice, which Meta displayed on 30 October, bears directly upon the question of how these restrictions came about. It concerned a post published by LiveLaw Hindi on Facebook on 18 October, consisting of image cards which reported the remarks of Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal on the Supreme Court and on the detention of protesters in Delhi, and it stated, “This is because we restricted access to this content under Rule 4(4) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, and pursuant to a legal request from to restrict this content.” The space in which the name of the requesting authority would ordinarily appear had been left blank. As a separate notice in respect of the same post refers to “a notice from The Government of India / Law Enforcement under Section 79(3)(b)”, it is evident that Meta itself distinguishes between a restriction made upon a notice under Section 79(3)(b) and a restriction made under Rule 4(4), and that it has acknowledged in writing the application of Rule 4(4) to the content of LiveLaw.

On 30 October, LiveLaw lodged complaints with Meta’s Grievance Officer for India, and the acknowledgements which it received were generic messages addressed to law enforcement officials and to persons wishing to “report policy violations”. The email address which Meta publishes for its Grievance Officer returned an automated reply stating that the address is one at which Meta deals with “questions about the grievance redressal mechanism process”, and directing the complainant to a web form. That form contains no category under which a publisher may dispute the restriction of its own content upon a “legal request”, and it requires the complainant to declare “a good-faith belief that the content you are reporting is unlawful”, a declaration which a publisher seeking the restoration of its own report is in no position to make.

Legal notices dated 30 October 2026 were served on the following day upon Meta and upon MeitY, with a copy marked to the Ministry of Home Affairs, calling for the restoration of the second reel and for copies of the “legal requests” and of the advisories within forty-eight hours. As neither Meta nor MeitY sent any reply, LiveLaw approached the Delhi High Court by a petition dated 4 November 2026.

The amendment which made automated tools mandatory

When the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (IT Rules) were notified in February 2021, Rule 4(4) required a significant social media intermediary, that is to say a platform with more than fifty lakh registered users in India, only to “endeavour to deploy technology-based measures, including automated tools”. By G.S.R. 120(E), which was notified on 10 February 2026 and came into force on 20 February 2026, MeitY substituted those words, so that such a platform “shall deploy appropriate technical measures, including automated tools or other suitable mechanisms” for the proactive identification of two categories of content. The first category consists of material depicting rape and child sexual abuse, and the second of “any information which is exactly identical in content to information that has previously been removed or access to which has been disabled” under Rule 3(1)(d), the provision which deals with takedowns upon a court order or upon an intimation from an officer of the government or the police. The only notice for which the rule provides is one to be displayed “to any user attempting to access such information”, and it makes no provision for any notice to the person who published the information.

By the same notification, the time within which a platform must act upon a takedown intimation was reduced from thirty-six hours to three, and under Rule 7 a platform which fails to observe the Rules loses the protection of safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act). A company which is obliged to deploy automated tools and to act within three hours, and which stands to lose its statutory immunity for any failure to do so, can be expected to construct a system which restricts content automatically and leaves little room for any independent examination of what is being restricted.

It should be said at once that LiveLaw’s petition does not question the use of technology for the detection of material depicting rape and child sexual abuse, and that it does not challenge Rule 3(1)(d) or Section 79(3)(b), both of which are under consideration in other proceedings. The challenge is confined to the second category in Rule 4(4), under which a single takedown is extended, by mandatory and automated means, to every item which a machine regards as identical.

The automated system which Meta put in place

On 25 April 2026, The Hindu reported, on the authority of a source within the company, that India is among a limited set of countries in which Facebook and Instagram “automatically restrict content, at scale and based on local law requirements”. Users in India have since received notices informing them that their content was restricted “through an automated system implemented pursuant to legal requirements” under the IT Rules, as we documented on 23 October.

The extent of the practice appears from Meta’s own transparency report, which records that between January and June 2026 the company restricted access to more than 5.4 million items in India for alleged violations of local law, whereas the corresponding figure for the preceding six months was a little over 41,000. Meta explains that the report includes countries in which it was “obligated to automatically restrict content, at scale and in country”, and it attributes the increase in India to the amended IT Rules.

The unpublished advisories of October 2026

In October 2026, while protests over the SIR were under way in Delhi, the Cyber Laws Division of MeitY issued two advisories, neither of which it has published. The first, dated 8 October 2026 and bearing File No. 16(2)/2026-CyberLaws, was addressed to all social media intermediaries and was reported by MediaNama on the same day; it asks them to “identify, prevent and not promote the dissemination of unlawful information” and to “accord priority to reports/complaints received from authorised Government agencies”. The second, dated 10 October 2026 and bearing File No. 6(2)/2026-Cyberlaws, was addressed to Meta alone, and it asks for “enhanced diligence”, for “particular attention” to content containing “unverified or misleading claims regarding the imposition of emergency, restrictions, police action or other official measures”, and for the strengthening of mechanisms for the “rapid identification, review and escalation” of content which is gaining reach. Meta is advised to take these measures “with immediate effect” and to “apprise the Ministry of the measures undertaken in compliance”.

The restriction of content increased markedly in the weeks which followed, and the tracker maintained by SFLC.in, as reported by ThePrint, recorded 181 instances of restriction covering 382 items between 1 and 18 October, of which 94 related to the protests and 84 carried a notice referring to an “automated system”. On Instagram alone, 174 posts and 59 accounts were restricted in October, as against 51 posts across Instagram, Facebook and X in July, according to Newslaundry, and over a period of thirty-one days 121 people wrote to IFF for assistance with takedowns. It was within three weeks of the advisories that the restrictions extended to the reports of Supreme Court hearings published by a legal news portal.

Analysis

The petition urges twenty grounds, of which the principal ones are set out below.

The restriction is the act of the State carried out through Meta

The first objection which a platform may be expected to raise is that it was engaged in nothing more than the moderation of content, and to this objection Meta’s own notice supplies the answer. Meta states that it reviewed each reel “against our policies” and thereafter restricted it only “in the location where it goes against local law”, which amounts to an acknowledgement that the reels offended none of Meta’s own rules, that they remain available outside India, and that the sole reason for their restriction is to be found in the IT Rules.

It is LiveLaw’s case that the legal requirement in question is Rule 4(4), operating together with the advisories of October 2026, and the petition accordingly sets the demands made by MeitY beside the conduct of Meta in the following manner.

Of the circumstances on which the petition relies, the interval of fifteen minutes is perhaps the most telling. Rule 3(1)(d) requires a takedown intimation to be reasoned and in writing, to be issued by an officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary or, in the police, of Deputy Inspector General, and to specify the legal basis of the demand and the URL to which it relates. It is scarcely conceivable that, within fifteen minutes of the upload of a reel, an officer of that rank could have viewed it, formed an opinion upon it and issued a reasoned intimation to Meta, and that Meta could then have completed the “legal and human rights assessment” which it claims to have made. The third reel, besides, concerns a petition about the rights of transgender persons and has no connection with the SIR, with the protests or with public order, from which the petition infers that the filter identifies LiveLaw’s reports by their format, presentation and branding and not by anything which they say.

Should that inference prove to be mistaken, and should it appear that a specific intimation or blocking direction was in fact issued against these reels, the position of the respondents would be no better, since no such intimation or direction has ever been shown to LiveLaw and the restriction would be unlawful on that ground as well.

Where a statutory rule compels a platform to block content, and deprives it of its immunity if it does not, the resulting restriction is in substance the act of the State carried out through the platform, and Rule 4(4), being “law” within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution, must conform to Part III. It is for the same reason that a writ petition lies against Meta in the present case. The Delhi High Court declined to entertain writ petitions against the suspension of accounts by Meta under its own policies in Sanchit Gupta v. Union of India (23 July 2024) and Sarthak Bhagat v. Union of India (27 October 2026), but it did so on the footing that no governmental mandate was involved, whereas here the governmental mandate is the very subject of the challenge.

Rule 4(4) exceeds the powers conferred by the IT Act

The protection of safe harbour under Section 79 of the IT Act rests upon the assumption that the intermediary plays a passive part, one of the conditions of the exemption being that the intermediary does not “select or modify the information contained in the transmission”, and Section 87(2)(zg) empowers the Central Government to prescribe no more than “the guidelines to be observed by the intermediaries” under Section 79(2). Neither provision authorises the government to conscript a platform into the task of seeking out and suppressing speech on its own initiative.

In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India [(2015) 5 SCC 1], the Supreme Court read down Section 79(3)(b) for the reason that an intermediary cannot be expected to judge which of the “millions of requests” made to it are legitimate (para 122), and the Delhi High Court held in Myspace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. [236 (2017) DLT 478] and in Kent RO Systems Ltd. v. Amit Kotak [240 (2017) DLT 3] that an intermediary cannot be required to screen all the content which it hosts. Rule 4(4) thus demands by delegated legislation what the parent Act, as the courts have construed it, does not permit.

The rule has the further effect of creating a regime for the blocking of content which stands wholly outside Section 69A. The Supreme Court sustained Section 69A in Shreya Singhal because a blocking order under that provision must record reasons in writing, so that it may be challenged, and because the originator of the content is to be heard before the order is made (paras 114 and 115). Under Rule 4(4), on the other hand, the decision is made by automated tools without any order, reasons, hearing or review, and a single intimation under Rule 3(1)(d), which is itself required to identify a specific URL, is extended without limit to every item which a machine takes to be the same. The government cannot be permitted to accomplish through the automated tools of a private company what it could not itself have done under Section 69A without observing the procedure which that provision prescribes.

The rule operates as a prior restraint upon publication

The first two reels were taken down before they had reached the greater part of their audience and before any person could have examined them, which is to say that they were subjected to a prior restraint. The courts have refused to permit the executive to impose such a restraint upon the press ever since Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi [1950 SCR 605], and the Supreme Court stated the principle in express terms in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1994) 6 SCC 632]. Even a court may postpone the reporting of its own proceedings only where that is necessary to avert a real and substantial risk to the fairness of a trial, and then only for a limited time, as the Supreme Court held in Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEBI [(2012) 10 SCC 603]. It follows that a restraint which the executive may not impose at all, and which a court may impose only in rare cases, cannot be delegated to the automated tools of a platform.

Automated tools cannot apply the test of “exactly identical” content

Automated tools do not read content in the sense in which the law understands that word, for what they detect are resemblances in visual frames, sound, text and keywords. In consequence, a report which describes, analyses or reproduces a part of some matter that was the subject of an earlier intimation is liable to be treated as “identical” to it, although its content, purpose and effect are altogether different, and it is difficult to see how a LiveLaw explainer of a hearing before the Supreme Court could ever be “exactly identical in content” to anything which an officer might lawfully have required to be taken down. A rule which brings protected speech within its reach in this manner is overbroad and has a chilling effect upon speech, and it was on this ground, among others, that Section 66A was struck down in Shreya Singhal (para 94).

The rule also fails the test of proportionality, under which the State may resort only to the least restrictive measure, as the Supreme Court held in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India [(2020) 3 SCC 637]. Less restrictive measures were plainly available, among them prior notice to the publisher, human review before any restriction is imposed, the exclusion of news and of reports of court proceedings, and a requirement that the person affected be told upon which intimation the restriction rests. It is true that the provisos to Rule 4(4) speak of proportionality, of “appropriate human oversight” and of a “periodic review” of the tools for accuracy and bias, but each of these matters is left to the platform itself, and the provisos confer no right upon the speaker, require nothing to be published and attach no consequence to the omission of the review. MeitY has thus made the use of automated tools compulsory without prescribing any standard of accuracy to which they must conform.

The rule gives notice to the reader and none to the publisher

Rule 4(4) requires a notice to be displayed only to the user who attempts to view the content, and it differs in this respect from Rule 4(8), under which a platform that removes content of its own accord must first notify the user, give its reasons and afford an adequate opportunity to dispute the decision. The result is that a person whose post is removed at the discretion of the platform receives notice, reasons and a hearing, whereas a person whose post is suppressed by automated tools under the compulsion of the State, which is much the graver intrusion, receives nothing at all. The petition contends that this is manifestly arbitrary and contrary to Article 14, relying upon Shayara Bano v. Union of India [(2017) 9 SCC 1], and that a procedure by which a person is silenced without notice, reasons or a hearing cannot be regarded as fair, just and reasonable within the meaning of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248].

The reporting of court proceedings is protected speech

The freedom of the press includes the freedom of circulation, for, as the Supreme Court observed in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [1950 SCR 594], “Liberty of circulation is as essential to that freedom as the liberty of publication”. Fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings are protected, in addition, by Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and by the principle of open justice which was affirmed in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1967 SC 1].

In Election Commission of India v. M.R. Vijayabhaskar [(2021) 9 SCC 770], the Election Commission sought a restraint upon the reporting of court proceedings by the media, and the Supreme Court refused it, holding that the freedom of speech and expression “extends to reporting the proceedings of judicial institutions as well”. Two of the three reels explain the affidavit of the Election Commission on the SIR and the challenges to that exercise, so that what the Supreme Court declined to order at the instance of the Commission has now befallen reports of the Commission’s own affidavit, without any disclosure of the authority at whose instance it was done. The reels concern, besides, the revision of electoral rolls, and the right of voters to information bearing upon elections was recognised in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms [(2002) 5 SCC 294].

An advisory is not law

Neither the IT Act nor the IT Rules confers upon MeitY any power to issue advisories to intermediaries, and still less advisories which call for action “with immediate effect” and for a report of compliance. MeitY has itself acknowledged the absence of such a power, for on 30 March 2026 it published a draft Rule 3(4) under which compliance with its advisories would become a condition of due diligence. As that draft has not been notified, the advisories of October 2026 seek to give effect in advance to a rule which does not exist.

A restriction upon speech must be founded upon a “law” within the meaning of Article 19(2), and that expression denotes a law having statutory force and not a departmental instruction, as the Supreme Court held in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. [(1964) 1 SCR 332] and again in Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala [(1986) 3 SCC 615].

The advisories operate, in addition, as a form of informal censorship, since they proceed from the Ministry which frames and administers the conditions on which a platform retains its safe harbour, and the courts have regard to the substance of such communications and not to the name which they bear. The Supreme Court of the United States held in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan [372 U.S. 58 (1963)], and again in National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo [602 U.S. 175 (2024)], that a government may not coerce a private party into suppressing speech which it could not itself suppress directly. When a platform which is already compelled to deploy automated tools is further advised to “identify, prevent and not promote” unlawful information, to give priority to the complaints of government agencies and to report to the Ministry on what it has done, the over-blocking of lawful reporting is the natural consequence, and it is a consequence for which neither Meta nor MeitY accepts responsibility.

The grievance mechanism affords no effective remedy

The respondents may be expected to contend that LiveLaw ought first to have approached Meta’s Grievance Officer and thereafter the Grievance Appellate Committee (GAC), and the petition meets this contention on two grounds.

The first is that the mechanism is not an alternative remedy at all, since the restriction flows from a rule framed, and from advisories issued, by MeitY itself. Meta’s Grievance Officer is in no position to disregard what Meta treats as a legal requirement, while the GAC, which is constituted by MeitY, can neither pronounce upon the validity of MeitY’s rule nor direct MeitY and the Ministry of Home Affairs to disclose the “legal request”.

The second is that the mechanism is not an efficacious remedy, since the Grievance Officer is allowed seven days to resolve a complaint, an appeal lies within thirty days thereafter, and the GAC is required only to “endeavour” to decide the appeal within a further thirty days. A grievance may therefore remain undecided for thirty-seven days even where the appeal is filed immediately and every authority adheres to the prescribed time, and in practice the position is a good deal worse, for 54,918 appeals were pending before the GAC on 2 November 2026. A report of a court hearing has its greatest value on the day of the hearing, and since the first reel was restored only after some seven hours, by which time the hearing had concluded, its restoration could not bring back the audience which had been lost.

There is, in addition, a continuing harm of a different kind, which arises from the terms on which Instagram is offered. Those terms permit Meta to restrict or disable an account which it regards as exposing it to legal risk, and Meta has taken that course with other users after repeated restrictions, informing one cartoonist that it had “repeatedly had to restrict access” to his content. As three of LiveLaw’s reels were restricted within four days, each further restriction brings @livelaw.in, an account built up over years of reporting, nearer to suspension, and it is for this reason that the petition seeks interim protection.

The pending challenges to the IT Rules do not cover this case

LiveLaw is already a petitioner in the batch of challenges to the IT Rules which is pending before the Delhi High Court and is led by Foundation for Independent Journalism v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 3125/2021. That batch, however, was instituted between 2021 and 2024 against the Rules as they then stood, at a time when Rule 4(4) required no more than an “endeavour”, while the other pending cases are concerned with the fact check unit, with Rule 3(1)(d) and the Sahyog Portal, and with the Blocking Rules. The petitions before the Bombay High Court challenge other provisions introduced or amended by G.S.R. 120(E), but not Rule 4(4), and although Meta is itself a petitioner in the batch of 2021, it has not, so far as LiveLaw is aware, challenged Rule 4(4) before any court.

Action

The hearing of 19 November 2026

The petition came up before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court consisting of Acting Chief Justice Nitin Wasudeo Sambre and Justice Sanjay Sharma, as LiveLaw reported. The respondents are the Union of India, through MeitY and the Ministry of Home Affairs, and Meta Platforms, Inc., the Ministry of Home Affairs having been made a party because the Delhi Police and the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre, which operates the Sahyog Portal, function under it.

Advocate Apar Gupta, appearing for LiveLaw, submitted that its reports had been taken down from Instagram and Facebook by the automated filters which platforms operate in consequence of the rules and advisories of the Union Government. He informed the Court that the most recent restriction had occurred on the previous night, and that it concerned a reel on the affidavit of the Delhi Police in which the Supreme Court was told that its order protecting journalists covering the protests against the Chief Election Commissioner was not intended to extend to “so-called reel makers and social media influencers”.

Additional Solicitor General Chetan Sharma, appearing for the Union, suggested that the petition might be treated as a representation, upon which the government would pass a speaking order after hearing LiveLaw. Counsel for LiveLaw responded that such a course would be “a mere formality”, a statement which the order records, and it is indeed difficult to see how a Ministry could determine by a speaking order whether a rule of its own making is constitutional.

The Court issued notice to the Union and to Meta, granted the respondents four weeks to file their counter-affidavits and listed the matter on 18 January 2027. LiveLaw did not press its application for interim relief at this hearing, but it requested an early date in view of the risk that the account as a whole might be suspended, and the Bench was also informed that similar matters stand listed on 9 February 2027.

The reliefs sought in the petition

The reliefs which the petition seeks from the Court are the following.

  1. The striking down of Rule 4(4), as substituted on 10 February 2026, to the extent that it requires platforms to deploy automated tools for the proactive identification and disabling of content “exactly identical” to content removed under Rule 3(1)(d), on the ground that it is beyond Sections 69A, 79 and 87 of the IT Act and violates Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution; or, in the alternative, the reading down of the rule so as to exclude reports of judicial proceedings and news and current affairs content, and so as to require that nothing be disabled without prior notice to the originator, a reasoned decision upon human review and a copy of the intimation under Rule 3(1)(d) on which the action is founded.
  2. The quashing of the advisories of 8 and 10 October 2026, together with a declaration that they confer no authority upon any intermediary to restrict content.
  3. A direction to MeitY, the Ministry of Home Affairs and Meta to produce every “legal request”, intimation or direction on the basis of which the three reels were restricted, including any communication made through the Sahyog Portal, together with the reasons for the restriction.
  4. A declaration that Meta’s automated system is unlawful in so far as it restricts the reports of news publishers without an order of a court or a reasoned intimation under Rule 3(1)(d) furnished to the publisher, and a direction to Meta to restore the second and third reels.
  5. An order restraining Meta from restricting LiveLaw’s content, reducing its distribution or suspending @livelaw.in on the basis of Rule 4(4), of the automated system or of the advisories, except upon an order of a court, an intimation under Rule 3(1)(d) or a direction under Section 69A of which a copy is furnished to LiveLaw at the same time.

LiveLaw has also filed an application for interim directions to the same effect, in which it asks in addition that the “legal requests” be placed on record within one week and that all records relating to the restrictions be preserved.

The next steps

The counter-affidavits of the respondents are due within four weeks, and the petition will next be heard on 18 January 2027. There is nothing to prevent Meta and MeitY from doing in the meantime what the petition asks of them, since Meta is free to restore the reels and to inform LiveLaw of the authority upon whose request it acted, and MeitY is free to publish its advisories and to withdraw them.

If a post or account of yours has been restricted in India “through an automated system”, “under Rule 4(4)” or upon a “legal request” which has not been shown to you, we would ask you to write to us at [email protected] with screenshots of every notice and reply which you have received, and to refrain from deleting the content in question.

We will continue to support this challenge and to report upon its progress as the case proceeds. Litigation of this kind, directed against a rule and against the automated system built upon it, occupies a small team for many months and is paid for by our members and donors, and we would be grateful for any donation to IFF which you are able to make.

Important documents

  1. Writ petition in Live Law Media Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., dated 4 November 2026 (link)
  2. LiveLaw’s report of the hearing, 19 November 2026 (link)
  3. The IT Rules, 2021, as amended up to 10 February 2026 by G.S.R. 120(E) (link)

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